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Abstract: By using accounting data from the largest utility companies of Europe, this note
illustrates the recent R&D performance in energy and telecommunication. Although not all the
companies under consideration behaved symmetrically, most of them reduced substantially their
R&D investment. Over the period 2000-05, their total R&D expenditures at current prices
decreased by 33%, while their R&D intensity (on sales) diminished from 1.1 to 0.7%. In discussing
the above findings, it is argued that a drop of this size is hardly justifiable and weakens the EU
economy in a non-negligible manner. 
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* In 2004 I published an article in which, among other things, I stressed the poor R&D record of Italian utility
companies (Sterlacchini, 2004). Some colleagues observed that, without international comparisons, my conclusion was
debatable. This note extends the analysis to the largest EU countries: my new conclusion is that Italian utility companies
perform as badly as their major European counterparts. With the usual disclaimers, I wish to thank Nicola Matteucci for
his remarks on a previous draft.
21. The issue
Monitoring the research activities of the major companies is a burdensome but useful task.
Technological change, rather than manna from heaven, is the outcome of the intentional efforts of
“flesh and body” private and public organisations. Since the largest firms undertake the bulk of a
country’s business research, a continuous inspection of their R&D expenditures should become
customary for economists and policy makers. 
From a private perspective, large companies should invest a stable share of their current revenues
on R&D in order to sustain their future stream of revenues. From a social point of view, this implies
a significant presence of big (industrial) R&D laboratories which, along with obvious direct benefits
for the hosting country, generate positive economic externalities (fruitful co-operation with
university research, attraction of outstanding scientists and engineers as well as high-tech foreign
direct investments, high-tech spin-offs). 
Among the largest European companies (or industrial groups), those supplying public utilities
(telecommunication services, electricity generation and distribution, gas provision) play a
remarkable role. A recent study of the European Commission (2005) provides sales data for 700
major EU companies in 2004: among the first eighteen (all with more than € 40 billion of sales)
there are seven utility companies. Thus, in spite of the ongoing process of liberalisation (much more
advanced in TLC than energy), the EU utility markets are still dominated by very big players
(mostly private entities). 
During the last decade, national and European regulation and competition authorities have
monitored the behaviour of these dominant firms with a view to favour the entry of new
competitors, avoid excessive prices for final customers and maintain the quality of services. In this
ongoing process of liberalisation, little or no attention has been put on the research activities of the
major utility companies of Europe. After all, in presence of greater competition (stemming from
new entrants as well as the possibility of extending their business over national borders), why these
companies should have dropped their R&D expenditures? 
Actually, this is what occurred in the first half of the 2000s. Obviously, not all the companies under
consideration behaved symmetrically, but most of them (and especially the electricity and gas
providers) decreased substantially their R&D investment. At current prices (that is neglecting
inflation) their total R&D expenditures in the 2000-01 biennium amounted to € 4.5 billion per year
while in 2004-05 they became € 3 billion (a reduction of 33%). Their sales, instead, increased from
411 to 440 billions so that, as a whole, the biggest European utility companies diminished their
R&D intensity (on sales) from 1.1 to 0.7%.
3This note aims primarily at stimulating the attention of European policy markers who, with respect
to the above phenomenon, have shown little or no concern. Investors and financial analysts are
mainly interested in the short-run profitability of these companies (listed in the major stock
exchanges of the world) and this can explain the negligence of newspapers and economic
magazines. Instead, the absence of reactions from national political bodies, regulation authorities
and the European Commission is hardly justifiable. The EC, in particular, is responsible for
monitoring the progress made in pursuing the Lisbon goals among which – as targeted in the 2002
Barcelona European Council -  there is that of reaching, for the whole EU in 2010, a 3% share of
R&D expenditures on GDP with two thirds of them funded by the private sector. How can this goal
be achieved if some of the largest European industrial groups reduce their R&D investment? By
evoking corporate responsibility, why the major utility companies should not contribute to the
economic progress of the EU?
After describing the processes of data collection and companies’ selection (section 2), this note
offers a comparative analysis of EU company data for electricity and gas (section 3),
telecommunication services (section 4) and aggregate public utilities (section 5). A discussion of the
findings is contained in the final section. 
2. The data 
Data on sales and R&D expenditures are taken from the consolidated group accounts provided by
the ultimate parent companies in their audited annual reports (downloadable from their web sites).
In most cases I also checked the Forms 20-F compiled by the companies for the US Security and
Exchange Commission in which, for the sake of transparency, the R&D section is indexed. When
both are available (that is almost always) the Form F-20 and the annual report indicate the same
R&D spending. 
For sales, the usual accounting definition of total sales net of taxes and shares of joint ventures and
associated company is used.  The R&D figure is the company cash spending indicated in the annual
report and, as such, it should only include that funded and performed by the company itself. Such a
figure derives from the accounting definition of R&D established by international standards and
based on the OECD “Frascati” manual.
The above are the same definitions adopted in two recent studies of the European Commission
(2004 and 2005) providing R&D, sales, and other financial data for the EU companies disclosing a
significant amount of R&D investment1:  500 companies are monitored in 2003 (with retrospective
                                                          
1 These two highly meritorious studies, titled Monitoring industrial research: the 2004 (and 2005) EU industrial R&D
investment scoreboard, are the outcomes of a close co-operation between the Directorate General Joint Research Centre
4information until 2000) and 700 in 2004. The independently collected figures presented in this note
for the years 2000-04 are almost always consistent with those reported by the above studies: to
them, I added the recently available company data for 2005.
Although the EU companies are not compelled to disclose their R&D investment, most of them do,
and this also occurs with utility companies. Two relevant exceptions are Endesa and Gas Natural
SDG, both Spanish companies2: the first is one of the largest electrical companies in the world and
the biggest electricity provider in Spain; the second is the major natural gas supplier of the same
country. 
Along with those of Spain, but for quite different reasons, UK-based electricity and gas companies
are not included in the analysis; in fact, thanks to the advanced process of liberalisation, none of
them owns a dominant position and records an amount of sales comparable to that of the largest
utility companies of Europe. To be added is that among the major players in the UK energy markets
there are many foreign companies (such as EdF, RWE and E.ON) which, instead, are taken into
account.
Due to their relative low level of sales, all the utility companies based on EU countries other than
France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK, are not considered in the present note. 
With respect to the sectoral grouping, because of the presence of many multi-utility companies,
electricity and gas companies are put together under the “energy” label. 
Another problem is that of two big energy providers, ENI and Suez, which derive a remarkable
portion of their revenues from oil extraction and refinement and the distribution of related products.
In these two cases, only the sales referring to gas and electricity are taken into account and,
consequently, only a fraction of their total R&D expenditures is considered in line with the share of
energy on total sales. With this procedure, the R&D investment of ENI and Suez is likely to be
overestimated. In general, for a few other dubious cases (namely, when the R&D investment was
missing or inconsistent for only one year) the same strategy, favourable to an overestimation, has
been followed.
Finally, for British Telecom I converted into euros its sales and R&D figures reported in UK
sterling. For this purpose, I used the same procedure applied in the first of the above mentioned EC
studies, concerned with 2003 (which is the central year of the period considered): a 0.7 euro/sterling
exchange rate constant over time. This procedure has the advantage of not affecting the R&D
changes and intensity of British Telecom while it could produce minor biases only when its figures
are added to those of the other EU telecom companies.
                                                                                                                                                                                                
and the Directorate General Research of the European Commission. For the first time in Europe, company level data
have not only been systematically collected and disclosed but also compared with those of non-EU based companies.
53. The electricity and gas companies
The R&D performance of energy companies over 2000-05 is illustrated in Table 1. It can be
examined by looking either at their current R&D expenditures and R&D intensity on sales. 
Table 1 - Sales and R&D expenditures of electricity and gas companies (€ million at
current prices)





Sales 25109 28781 29977 31427 31011 34059 20.75
R&D expenditures 124 100 100 40 20 20 -82.15
R&D/Sales (%) 0.49 0.35 0.33 0.13 0.06 0.06 -85.36
ENI - Gas & Power (Italy)
Sales 14427 16098 15297 16068 17302 22969 31.93
R&D expenditures 70 67 56 74 76 64 1.82
R&D/Sales (%) 0.49 0.41 0.37 0.46 0.44 0.28 -20.61
Electricité de France*
Sales 34424 38153 44643 44919 46788 51051 34.81
R&D expenditures 379 418 432 381 402 455 7.53
R&D/Sales (%) 1.10 1.10 0.97 0.85 0.86 0.89 -20.27
Gaz de France**
Sales 11210 14360 14546 16647 17731 22394 56.92
R&D expenditures 92 118 118 89 90 73 -22.20
R&D/Sales (%) 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.53 0.51 0.33 -49.06
Suez - Energy (France) 
Sales 19586 26374 24242 26635 29334 30400 29.97
R&D expenditures 113 156 75 53 61 62 -54.12
R&D/Sales (%) 0.58 0.59 0.31 0.20 0.21 0.20 -64.64
E.ON (Germany)
Sales 74048 69770 36126 42541 44745 56399 -29.67
R&D expenditures 572 510 380 69 55 24 -92.70
R&D/Sales (%) 0.77 0.73 1.05 0.16 0.12 0.04 -88.99
RWE (Germany)
Sales 56751 60040 43487 42771 40996 41919 -29,01
R&D expenditures 540 650 435 436 128 55 -84,62
R&D/Sales (%) 0,95 1,08 1,00 1,02 0,31 0,13 -78,20
*= missing R&D data for 2000 are estimated by applying the R&D intensity on sales in 2001.
**= missing R&D data for 2001 are estimated by applying the average R&D intensity on sales in 2000 and 2002.
                                                                                                                                                                                                
2 The unavailability of R&D data for these companies is confirmed by the already mentioned studies of the EC in which
Endesa and Gas Natural SDG are never included. 
6Five out of seven companies experienced a substantial decrease of the R&D investment at current
prices (i.e. gross of the inflation rate). To limit the effect of annual volatility, I computed the rate of
change between the biennia 2000-01 and 2004-2005: it ranges from minus 49% of Gaz the France
to minus 93% of E.ON. The only two companies showing an increase at current prices are
Electricité de France (+7.5%) and ENI (+2%). 
To be stressed is that, over the same period, only the two German companies - E.ON and RWE –
recorded a reduction of sales of around 30% while all the others had remarkable increases ranging
from 21% of ENEL to 57% of Gaz de France. As a consequence, the ratio between R&D
investment and sales declined substantially in all the major energy companies of Europe, included
EdF and ENI (-20%) although the reduction of the others was by far much intense (from -49% of
Gaz de France to -89% of E.ON).
4 The telecom companies
Table 2 two illustrates the sales and R&D data of the five largest EU telecom companies. With the
relevant exception of France Telecom, recording an increase of 27%, the other four companies
decreased substantially their R&D investment at current prices, from minus 11% of Telecom Italia
to minus 57% of Deutsche Telekom. It must be stressed that, for the latter company, the strong
R&D drop between 2003 and 2005 (-77.8% at current prices) is confirmed by the reduction of its
R&D employees, who diminished from about 6500 to 2600 units (-60%)3.
Among the five companies, only Telecom Italia had a small reduction of sales (-2.5%) over the
period considered, while in the other cases there was a significant rise, especially for Deutsche and
France Telecom (+32 and +25% respectively).
As a result, all the major companies but France Telecom decreased their R&D intensity on sales
with a minimum of –10% (Telecom Italia) to a maximum of -52% (Deutsche Telekom). 
 
                                                          
3 To my request, a responsible of DT investor relations said that the changes in the reported R&D figures are due to
different accounting methods. However, the data on R&D employees - consistently defined in the various annual
reports as those “ involved in projects and activities aimed at creating new products and marketing them to customers” -
indicate that the staggering R&D drop of DT was real and cannot be entirely ascribed to changes in accounting
procedures.
7Table 2 - Sales and R&D expenditures of telecom companies (€ million at current prices)





Sales 28911 30818 30400 30850 28292 29919 -2.54
R&D expenditures 268 141 121 148 181 180 -11.74
R&D/Sales (%) 0.93 0.46 0.40 0.48 0.64 0.60 -10.34
France Telecom
Sales 33674 43026 46630 46121 47157 49000 25.37
R&D expenditures 449 567 576 478 564 725 26.89
R&D/Sales (%) 1.33 1.32 1.24 1.04 1.20 1.48 0.94
Deutsche Telekom*
Sales 40911 48300 53700 55800 57880 59604 31.69
R&D expenditures 865 900 900 900 550 200 -57.51
R&D/Sales (%) 2.11 1.86 1.68 1.61 0.95 0.34 -67.68
British Telecom**
Sales 23036 24487 26353 26753 26456 26604 11.65
R&D expenditures 493 520 517 543 477 367 -16.64
R&D/Sales (%) 2.14 2.12 1.96 2.03 1.80 1.38 -25.32
Telefonica (Spain)***
Sales 28488 31052 27999 28400 30281 37882 14.48
R&D expenditures 588 641 513 444 461 544 -18.22
R&D/Sales (%) 2.06 2.06 1.83 1.56 1.52 1.44 -28.33
*= inconsistent R&D data for 2004 are estimated by applying the average R&D intensity on sales in 2003 and 2005.
**= the exchange rate to convert into euros the British Telecom figures is 0.7 UK sterling and constant over time.
***= inconsistent R&D data for 2001 are estimated by applying the R&D intensity on sales in 2000.
5. Summing up
To provide a global picture of the recent R&D behaviour of the largest European utility companies,
I summed up their sales and R&D expenditures. Table 3 shows the results for energy, telecom and
total utilities, while a graphical representation of R&D intensity trends is depicted in figure 1. 
Overall, as compared to a small increase of sales (+7%), there has been a 37% reduction of R&D
investment at current prices: as a consequence, the EU utility companies as a whole recorded a 41%
decrease of their R&D intensity.
The R&D reduction was particularly severe in the electricity and gas sector in which about 60% of
the expenditures reported in the initial biennium vanished. In presence of an almost constant level
of sales, the R&D intensity of energy companies decreased by the same percentage.
8Table 3 - Sales and R&D expenditures of European utility companies (€ million at 
current prices)






Sales 235555 253576 212771 221008 227907 259191 -0.42
R&D expenditures 1777 1864 1521 1089 771 691 -59.84
R&D/Sales (%) 0.75 0.73 0.71 0.49 0.34 0.27 -59.38
Total telecom companies
Sales 155020 177683 185082 187924 190066 203009 18.15
R&D expenditures 2663 2769 2627 2513 2233 2016 -21.77
R&D/Sales (%) 1.72 1.56 1.42 1.34 1.17 0.99 -33.82
Total utility companies
Sales 390575 431259 397853 408932 417973 462200 7.10
R&D expenditures 4440 4632 4148 3602 3005 2707 -37.05
R&D/Sales (%) 1.14 1.07 1.04 0.88 0.72 0.59 -41.00
Considering its higher level of technological opportunities as well as its sales’ increase (+18%), also
the performance of the telecom sector is quite disappointing: the R&D expenditures of telecom
companies dropped by 22% while their R&D intensity on sales by 34%. 










9The different technological opportunities between energy and telecom companies are well depicted
by figure 1 in which the former systematically display a lower intensity of R&D spending. The
same figure is also useful to stress that the decline in R&D intensity over 2000-05 was an almost
continuous phenomenon although, for energy companies, it significantly accelerated in 2003.     
6. Discussion 
In this concluding section, the above findings are discussed in the light of some possible objections.
A first one is that the R&D drop by utility companies is a recent phenomenon and, as such, it could
be transitory and reversible. This argument is at odds with the available evidence indicating that the
R&D reduction started well before 2000, pushed by the privatisation of previously state-owned
companies and the deregulation (or liberalisation) of utility markets. 
According to Florio (2004; table 9.8, p. 321), British Telecom invested 2.7% of its sales on R&D
before the privatisation (1980-84) and around 2% after (1985-99); as table 2 indicates there was a
little improvement over 2000-03 but, in the subsequent years, the R&D intensity of BT fell
significantly below 2%. ENEL, the dominant electricity provider in Italy, began to be partially
privatised in 1999. In 1998 it spent € 181 million in R&D which became 145 in 1999 and 124 in
2000. From 1998 to 2000 its R&D intensity on sales decreased from 0.88 to 0.49 and then, as
shown in table 1, continued to fall over the next years. 
But aside from the records of individual companies, in the case of “energy R&D” a marked
decrease was patent since the early 1990s. Dooley (1998) has shown that this occurred in many
developed countries (with the exception of Japan) and it was mainly due to the behaviour of energy
companies (some already private, others aware of their future privatisation): in some countries (such
as the UK and the Nordic European countries) they already operated in deregulated markets, while
in others (US, Germany and Italy) they were moving in the same direction. As a result, most energy
companies reduced R&D investments by refocusing their innovative strategies towards short-term,
customer-oriented goals. The latter have little to do with the long-term goal of guaranteeing the
future supply of cheaper and cleaner energy, crucial for the economic prospects of a country. The
conclusion was that “long-term energy R&D […] is unlikely to be supported by individual utilities
in a competitive, deregulated utility market” (Dooley, 1998., p. 554). Unfortunately, only with the
exception of Electricité de France, this prediction is confirmed by the recent performances of the
largest energy companies of Europe.    
It is likely that the R&D behaviour of European telecom companies can be ascribed to a shift of
corporate strategy similar to that stressed for energy companies (more emphasis on short-term goals
and customers’ needs, less attention on the efficiency of telecom infrastructures). However, before
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adopting the same interpretation, it would be necessary to collect a number of consistent pieces of
evidence which, at present, are not available.
Another relevant issue is whether the R&D disengagement of utility companies is really important
for European countries. To answer, I first assumed that these companies had maintained over 2001-
04 the same R&D intensity recorded in 2000. Then, I computed the annual differences between
hypothesised and actual R&D expenditures: they raised from € 0.27 billion in 2001 to 1.75 in 2004.
These figures estimate the foregone annual R&D expenditures due to the behaviour of utility
companies. As a term of comparison, I summed up the total R&D expenditures funded by business
enterprises in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK4: they were about € 71 billion in 2000 and
80.8 in 2004, with an increase, at current prices, of 13.9%. By adding the R&D expenditures “lost”
by the twelve companies considered in this note, there would have been an increase of 15.3%. At a
first sight, the difference seems modest but it is instead quite relevant if one considers the small
R&D increases experienced by EU countries during the last years (see Eurostat, 2005a). The
conclusion that can be drawn from the above exercise is that, with a declining contribution of its
largest utility companies, the EU cannot improve substantially its R&D intensity. Obviously, the
situation is not the same across countries: French utility companies, on average, performed much
better than their German counterparts. However, since the major companies operate in many
European markets, the issue should not be left to national policy makers alone. 
It must be stressed that, with respect to this phenomenon, the usual political reaction in Europe has
been that of resignation, as if the R&D cuts of the largest utility companies were more irreversible
than climate changes. Take, as an example, a period extracted from a note of the UK Parliament on
electricity networks: 
“Newer technologies offer the hope for cost-effective and environmental less damaging
forms of electricity generation, but since privatisation, investment by the Electricity
Supply Industry in research and development (R&D) has dropped significantly. R&D in
electricity network has been especially poorly served. Recognising this, the Government
provides direct R&D support and is seeking to encourage firms to innovate in this area”
(Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, 2001, p. 4).
A further quotation can be found in a report of an European research network composed of recently
established R&D agencies working in the electricity field:
                                                          
4 To make such a computation I combined the latest statistics available for total R&D (Eurostat, 2005a) and that funded
by the business sector (Eurostat, 2005b). The 2004 R&D figures are available, although in a provisional form, only for
France and Germany; for the other countries I assumed that in 2004 the R&D share on GDP was equal to that of the
previous year. The shares of R&D funded by the business sector refer to 2002 for all the countries considered but Italy,
for which the 2001 share is taken from Sterlacchini (2004); these shares are applied to all the examined years.
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“With the liberalisation, the Utility companies, who previously funded much of the
research in the electricity sector in-house, have reduced their R&D expenditure. As
such, […], funding has become available at national level through various Ministries
and Government Agencies in these liberalised markets” (ENIRDGnet, 2004, p. 4).
Thus, if private utility companies invest less in R&D, the only thing that can be done is to increase
public R&D. Against this argument two main objections can be raised. First, it is not necessary to
be an expert of technology for understanding that public R&D cannot be a substitute for private
R&D; at best, they complement each other. In other words, technological excellence requires the
presence of both public and industrial R&D laboratories with the former more devoted to the “R”
(or to basic research) and the latter more involved in the “D” component. Secondly, due to the
budget constraints of European national governments, it is unlikely that public funds may replace
the amount of R&D dropped by utility companies5. 
In this respect, the Italian case for electricity provides a good example. Historically, ENEL funded
and conducted research for the national electricity system. After the 1999 privatisation, a
governmental decree established that CESI (a corporate company) was responsible for this task and
ENEL transferred to it all the related R&D facilities and personnel. After that, the system research
has been mainly funded by the Italian government (cf. ENIRDGnet, 2004, p. 24). Over the period
2000-05 CESI recorded, on average, € 55 million of revenues due to research activities. By
summing up this figure with the R&D expenditures of ENEL (see table 1) it can be seen that the
1998 investment of  € 181 million  performed  by ENEL alone was never recovered in the following
period and, during the last years, decreased to € 75.
The Italian electricity story is also useful to contrast the idea that most private utility companies are
not less innovative than before but, instead of performing R&D activities in-house, have simply
chosen to outsource them to private companies and/or public agencies. The better counter-argument
I found with respect to this objection is taken from an inquiry carried out in 1999 by the Parliament
of Australia6:
“While outsourcing has its benefits it can exacerbate problems mentioned earlier, such
as the move away from long-term R&D – as utilities which outsource R&D tend to
focus on short-term projects. The critical mass for R&D can also be affected by
outsourcing and downsizing on former centres of excellence, with experts either leaving
the field or being distributed over a number of service providers. There are also
                                                          
5 Looking at the US, Dooley (1998, p. 554) pointed out that the federal budget deficit could not allow the Department of
Energy “to increase its energy R&D investments in order to fill the gap being left by the ongoing reductions in the
private sector’s investments in energy R&D”. 
6 As stated in the executive summary (page xv) “The inquiry was prompted by concerns that competition policy,
privatisation and outsourcing during the past decade may have had an adverse effect on the R&D conducted in those
corporatised or privatised public sector agencies (such as the energy utilities) now operating in a commercial
environment”. 
12
suggestions that outsourcing can favour overseas R&D providers” (Parliament of
Australia – House of Representatives, 1999, p. xxii).
To be noticed is that the “critical mass” argument is consistent with that introduced in the
introductory section of this note, stressing that the presence of big industrial R&D laboratories
provides strong economic advantages to the hosting countries. 
A final objection is that the R&D decline in utilities is common to all the developed countries of the
world. This is true, but the existing evidence indicates that the problem is much more severe in
Europe. According to the last edition of the EC study on company R&D (2005), also the non-EU
companies active in telecommunication services and electricity – mainly based in Japan and South
Korea7 – experienced a significant decrease of R&D investment. However, their reduction of R&D
expenditures at current prices over 2001-04 was only 0.2% in telecommunication and 9.4% in
electricity; in the same sectors, during 2003-04, their average R&D intensity on sales was
respectively 2 and 0.9%. Considering the same years, the debacle of the major European utilities is
not comparable: R&D expenditures diminished by 19% in telecommunication and 58% in energy
while R&D intensities were, respectively, 1.3 and 0.4% (for these computations see table 3).
In conclusion, it is difficult to find convincing arguments that can justify (or reduce the concerns
about) the poor R&D performance of the largest European utility companies. I think that, both at the
EU and national level, governments and regulation authorities should put this problem on their
agendas and react with appropriate measures.
  
                                                          
7 The largest non-EU telecom companies considered are NTT (Japan), AT&T (USA), Telstra (Australia) and two South
Korean companies (KT and SK Telecom). Instead, the majority of non-EU electricity companies are Japanese. 
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